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Provisional Arrest and
Incarceration in the
International Criminal
Tribunals
Melinda Taylor* and Charles Chernor Jalloh**

Abstract
This article examines the widely ignored but important issue regarding the provisional
arrest and detention of persons suspected of having committed international crimes by
international or internationalized courts. The paper examines the pioneer case law and
practice of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, as well as the emerging practice of the permanent International
Criminal Court, to evaluate how these courts have generally addressed the rights of these
individuals to due process and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention before prosecutors
seek formal charges against them.
The authors argue that while the early international jurisprudence established apparently
strong legal standards to preserve the rights of suspects, using doctrines such as abuse of
process, these courts have generally failed to offer the meaningful remedies required to resolve
manifest violations of such fundamental human rights by the detaining authorities. The
article offers preliminary recommendations on how, going forward, the rights guaranteed to
suspects allegedly involved in the worst crimes known to law in international(ized) courts may
be better protected.
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I.

Introduction
Nature abhors a vacuum—so does the law; or rather, so should the law. Post-9/11, the

existence of legal black holes concerning the protection and enforcement of detainees’ rights
has attracted almost universal condemnation from the United Nations and various regional
human rights courts. Indeed, in its recent report to the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, the United States of America proudly proclaimed that “[w]e start from the
premise that there are no law-free zones, and that everyone is entitled to protection under
law.”1
It is thus surprising that the same disapprobation has not been applied to the legal black
holes, which have tainted the record of the various ad hoc courts established over the past
twenty years to dispense justice to countries that have experienced genocide, serious
violations of international humanitarian law, and crimes against humanity. Notwithstanding
the fact that some of these courts are established by the U.N. Security Council, acting
pursuant to its extraordinary Chapter VII power, they are all powerless to implement their
own decisions.2 They are therefore completely reliant on national authorities or multinational peacekeeping bodies to arrest and detain suspects and defendants before their
transfer to the court in question.
This enforced division of tasks, which arises in part from the state-centric nature of the
international legal system, has created ambiguity concerning who is responsible for
remedying any violations of a suspect’s or defendant’s rights, which may have occurred prior
to his or her transfer to the relevant international or hybrid court. Indeed, having entrusted
national authorities with the apprehension aspects of the criminal justice process, can the
tribunals subsequently distance themselves from any violations which may have been
committed by those national authorities?
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights provides that no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention,3 and that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law.”4 This right was enshrined in Article 2 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.5 Under that provision, states undertook to ensure that any
person whose rights are violated shall not only have an effective remedy, but also to ensure
that any person claiming a remedy shall have his or her right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative, legislative or other authorities, and to ensure that such
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Report of the United States of America Submitted to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights in Conjunction with the Universal Periodic Review ¶ 82 (2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/146379.pdf.
See U.N. Charter Ch. VII (conferring powers on the United Nations Security Council to determine
any threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression and to make recommendations,
or decide what measures to take, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security, with decisions being binding on all U.N. member states pursuant
to Article 25).
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 9, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
Id. art. 8.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), annex, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16 at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
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authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.6 However, this right to a remedy
before national courts is meaningless if those courts have ceded their jurisdiction over the
case to an international or internationalized court. There is also a lingering perception which
emerges from the jurisprudence of these courts that, notwithstanding the presumption of
innocence, persons accused of the most horrific crimes in the legal lexicon are not so entitled.
Moreover, political realities have inevitably played an unfortunate role in the practical
challenges that beset these courts, and the judicial response to such realities. For example,
the early promise set out by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in the 1999 Barayagwiza decision that every victim of a rights violation
deserved a remedy7 was swiftly reined back in the 2000 review decision.8 It is, of course,
difficult to dissociate the latter decision from the Rwandan government threat that it would
cease all forms of cooperation with the ICTR if Barayagwiza were to be released.
This Article analyzes the main jurisprudence which has emerged from the different
international courts and tribunals regarding provisional arrest and detention. It assesses
whether, and if so how well, the courts and tribunals have addressed the lacuna arising from
the outsourcing or subcontracting of the incarceration function to national authorities. The
specific focus here is on individuals provisionally detained by national authorities, at the
request of an international(ized) court, before they are formally charged with any crimes.
The Article proceeds in two parts. Part II focuses on the early as well as more recent
practice of the pioneer U.N. international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It
then discusses provisional detention in the jurisprudence of the mixed courts for Cambodia
and Lebanon. Part III draws some conclusions from the review of the legal standards
established in the jurisprudence. Keeping in mind that this is largely uncharted area of
international criminal tribunal practice, the conclusion offers initial practical
recommendations on ways in which the system of provisional arrest or pre-charge
incarceration might be improved. Here, the authors draw on the recent and seemingly more
progressive jurisprudence from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon which appears to enhance
the remedies enjoyed by suspects and defendants whose rights have been violated.

II.

Provisional Arrest in International Criminal Justice
A. The Practice of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals
The ICTR experienced fewer difficulties than its counterpart, the International Criminal

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in apprehending accused, but seemingly more
difficulties in conducting investigations and preparing indictments in a timely manner. There
have thus been several ICTR cases in which the defendants alleged that they were detained

6.
7.
8.
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Id. art. 2.
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶¶ 72, 76, 88, 112 (Nov. 3,
1999), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.pdf.
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision on Review and/or
Reconsideration
(Sept.
14,
2000),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/140900.pdf.
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for the tribunal by national authorities, especially during the early part of its mandate.9
These arrests usually preceded the prosecution’s filing of indictments, and their detention
and transfer to the seat of the court in Arusha, Tanzania. In the first appellate decision to
consider the status of such persons—the landmark Barayagwiza appeal decision—the ICTR
Appeals Chamber both broadened the notion as to when the Tribunal should assume
responsibility for the detention of a suspect by national authorities, and explicitly stated that
the defendant would have a right to a remedy irrespective of the author of the violation.10
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was arrested in March 1996 and held in Cameroon for nineteen
months without being informed of the charges against him.11 Following his transfer to the
Tribunal, he was held for a further ninety-six days without making an initial appearance.12
In relation to the period of detention in Cameroon, the Chamber observed that on February
21, 1997, the Prosecutor had requested the Cameroonian authorities to provisionally detain
Barayagwiza under Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.13 Under that provision,
the Prosecutor may, in cases of urgency, request a state to take provisional measures,
including detaining a suspect, if he believes that the suspect might flee from the
jurisdiction.14
On March 4, 1997, the Tribunal issued an order directing Cameroon to provisionally
detain Barayagwiza pending his transfer to the ICTR under Rule 40bis. The order further
specified that the suspect be temporarily detained within the ICTR detention unit for a
maximum of thirty days, and pending the filing of an indictment by the Prosecutor within
thirty days. Notwithstanding this order, the indictment against Barayagwiza was not
confirmed until October 23, 1997, and the defendant was not transferred to the Tribunal until
November 19, 1997.15
The ICTR Appeals Chamber noted that whilst Rule 40bis specified that a suspect could
only be provisionally detained by the international tribunal for a maximum of thirty days
(unless the judge extends the provisional detention order for a maximum of ninety days in
total), Rule 40 did not set out explicit deadlines as to the length of time which a national
authority could provisionally detain a suspect upon a request by the Prosecutor.16 Citing the
principle of effective interpretation, the Appeals Chamber observed that:

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44-I, Decision on the Defence Motion
Concerning the Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused and on the Defence Notice of
Urgent Motion to Expand and Supplement the Record of 8 December 1999 Hearing (May 8, 2000),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kajelijeli/decisions/080500.pdf; Prosecutor v. André
Rwamakuba et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the Defence Motion Concerning the Illegal
Arrest
and
Illegal
Detention
of
the
Accused
(Dec.
12,
2000),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rwamakuba/decisions/121200.pdf. Similar claims
were also made in other cases such as those involving Edouard Karemera and Mathieu
Ngirumpatse. Most of the suspects were arrested in Cameroon, where twelve to fourteen Rwandans
were arrested on April 15, 1996.
Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision.
Id. ¶ 51.
Id. ¶ 67.
Id. ¶¶ 54–56.
Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 10, 30.
Id. ¶¶ 22, 30–31, 44–45.
Id. ¶¶ 46–48.
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The purpose of Rule 40bis is to restrict the length of time a suspect may be detained
without being indicted. We cannot accept that the Prosecutor, acting alone under Rule
40, has an unlimited power to keep a suspect under provisional detention in a State,
when Rule 40bis places time limits on such detention if the suspect is detained at the
Tribunal’s detention unit. Rather, the principle of effective interpretation mandates
that these Rules be read together and that they be restrictively interpreted.17
In order to determine whether the stricter requirements of Rule 40bis should be applied,
the Appeals Chamber then considered whether Barayagwiza could be deemed to have been
detained under the authority of the ICTR during the period he was incarcerated in
Cameroon. The Appeals Chamber noted that “but for” the request of the Prosecutor under
Rule 40, and the subsequent Rule 40bis request for transfer, the defendant would have been
released by the Cameroon authorities in February, which is when they had denied Rwanda’s
request that Barayagwiza be extradited to its jurisdiction for trial.18 The appellate court
concluded that Cameroon was holding the defendant on constructive custody for the
international tribunal, and that as such, the ICTR was responsible for the fact that the
defendant was being detained, although not for each and every aspect of the conditions of his
detention by Cameroonian authorities.19
The Appeals Chamber thus applied Rule 40bis, and held that the maximum time limit of
ninety days had clearly been exceeded.20 The total length of his detention in Cameroon could
also be considered to be unreasonable by human rights standards concerning provisional
detention.21 The Appeals Chamber also found that Barayagwiza’s right to be promptly
informed of the nature of the charges against him was also violated during this period.22
Notwithstanding this detailed analysis concerning the responsibility of the ICTR for his
detention in Cameroon, the Appeals Chamber subsequently made the significant finding that
under the abuse of process doctrine, according to which a court may decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant if to do so would be antithetical to the causes of justice, “it is
irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged violations of the
Appellant’s rights.”23 Accordingly, the judges concluded that the abuse of process doctrine
could still be triggered if Barayagwiza’s detention had been attributable to Cameroon and not
the international tribunal.24 The Appeals Chamber reasoned that “[a]t this juncture, it is
irrelevant that only a small portion of that total period of provisional detention is attributable
to the Tribunal, since it is the Tribunal—and not any other entity—that is currently
adjudicating the Appellant’s claims.”25
Given these strong statements, it is perplexing that the Appeals Chamber only took into
consideration the time periods during which he had been detained in Cameroon pursuant to a
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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Id. ¶ 46.
Id. ¶ 55.
Id. ¶ 61.
Id. ¶ 67.
Id. ¶ 67.
Id. ¶ 85.
Id. ¶ 73.
Id. ¶ 85. The Appeals Chamber concluded that “even if fault is shared between the three organs of
the Tribunal—or is the result of the actions of a third party, such as Cameroon—it would undermine
the integrity of the judicial process to proceed.” Id. ¶ 73.
Id. ¶ 85.
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request by the ICTR Prosecutor, and excluded the interim period of approximately nine
months during which the Cameroonian authorities continued to detain him pursuant to an
extradition request by Rwanda in order to prosecute him for the same alleged crimes. It may
be that the judges felt that matter to be outside their jurisdiction, insofar as his detention at
the behest of a different authority (Rwanda) does not necessarily translate into responsibility
for the Tribunal. On the other hand, while the Prosecutor’s request for the suspect to be
detained followed only two days after the Rwandan extradition request, which might have
been deemed displaced because of the international court’s primacy over national
jurisdictions, this judicial approach may be criticized on at least two grounds.
First, the ICTR Prosecutor filed his request for detention under Rule 40 the same day that
the Cameroon authorities rejected Rwanda’s request for extradition.26 Second, the ICTR
Prosecutor appears to have adopted an unhelpful “wait and see approach.” With this view, it
would seem that the Prosecution was only prepared to step in to claim jurisdiction if the
defendant could not be extradited and prosecuted in Rwanda. The timing of the requests
suggests a measure of coordination between the national authority and the Prosecutor. And it
may be that this is a matter that properly falls within the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
especially if investigations were ongoing and a determination had not been made to pursue
this particular defendant. However, it is arguable that such an approach is hardly consistent
with the principles of prosecutorial diligence, so eloquently set out in the decision, and that by
waiting to assert the ICTR’s primacy, the Prosecutor had materially contributed to the length
of the defendant’s detention in Cameroon.
In its analysis of the scope of the abuse of process doctrine, the Appeals Chamber also
concluded that,
[T]he abuse of process doctrine may be relied on in two distinct situations: (1) where
delay has made a fair trial for the accused impossible; and (2) where in the
circumstances of a particular case, proceeding with the trial of the accused would
contravene the court’s sense of justice, due to pre-trial impropriety or misconduct.27
In accordance with this finding, the defendant would still have the right to rely on the abuse
of process doctrine even if he or she is unable to prove deliberate impropriety or misconduct.
In terms of the appropriate remedy for these violations of the rights of the accused, the
Prosecution argued that the accused was entitled to either an order requiring an expeditious
trial or credit for any time provisionally served.28 With respect to the first of the Prosecutor’s
suggestions, the Appeals Chamber noted that an order for the Appellant to be expeditiously
tried would be superfluous as a remedy since the accused is already entitled to an expedited
trial pursuant to Article 19(1) of the statute that sets out the fundamental rights of suspects
and accused.29
Regarding the second suggestion by the Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber was
unconvinced that it could adequately protect the accused and provide an adequate remedy for
the violations of his rights, particularly in the event that the accused is acquitted.30
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 77.
Id. ¶ 102.
Id. ¶ 103.
Id. ¶ 103.
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Consequently, the Appeals Chamber ordered that the accused be released to Cameroon, and
that the order would be with prejudice to the Prosecution (i.e., the Prosecution would be
barred from issuing a new indictment against the accused and seeking his re-arrest).31
After learning of the decision, the Government of Rwanda threatened to end all
cooperation with the ICTR.32 This would have meant that the Prosecutor would have had
serious difficulty to conduct any investigations into international crimes in the territory of
Rwanda. The Prosecution therefore filed a request with the Appeals Chamber to review the
decision under Rule 119 on the basis that it had “new facts” of a decisive character.33 The
Appeals Chamber had a different composition due to the departure of Judge Kirk Macdonald,
whose reasoning appeared to have given great weight to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
in the abuse of process context. This newly composed Chamber accepted these new facts and
reversed its decision to release the accused.34
Regarding the violations that occurred prior to his transfer to the Tribunal, the Chamber
attached importance to evidence, which apparently demonstrated that the defendant would
have been aware of the nature of the charges against him from May 3, 1996 onwards.35 There
was also evidence that the delays in his transfer to the Tribunal appeared to be attributable
to Cameroon.36 In other words, Barayagwiza was, at most, kept in the dark about the charges
against him for a total of eighteen days. The Chamber concluded that the new facts
“diminish[ed] the role played by the failings of the Prosecutor as well as the intensity of the
violation of the rights of the Appellant.”37 The Appeals Chamber therefore held that the
violations were not sufficiently grave to justify the defendant’s release, and that it would be
adequate to either compensate the defendant if he were to be eventually acquitted, or to
reduce his sentence if convicted.38
Since the decision was predicated upon its consideration of new facts, as opposed to a
reconsideration of the law,39 the Appeals Chamber did not have the power to reverse its
earlier legal findings, which thus remain applicable.40 However, in expressly attributing its
decision to the “new fact” that it was Cameroon, rather than the Prosecutor, that was
responsible for the delays in transferring Barayagwiza, the Appeals Chamber appears to be
implicitly reversing its earlier finding in the November 1999 decision that it was “irrelevant
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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Id. ¶¶ 108, 113.
See Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor’s
Request
for
Review
or
Reconsideration),
¶
34
(Mar.
31,
2000),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs20000331.pdf.
Id. ¶¶ 7, 13, 15, 25.
Id. ¶¶ 74–75.
Id. ¶¶ 54–55.
Id. ¶ 58.
Id. ¶ 71.
Id. ¶ 75.
The Appeals Chamber rejected the Prosecutor’s request for reconsideration. Id. ¶ 73.
The Tribunal has power to review or to reconsider its decisions when a new fact has been discovered
which was not known at the time of the proceedings before the Appeals Chamber, and which could
have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision. Either the convicted person or the Prosecutor
may submit an application for review of the judgment, which in the normal course, is subject to the
res judicata principle. In this instance, the Tribunal considered that it had the power to review its
earlier decision; such review was necessary due to the finality of the decision, the remedy of which
was dismissal of the indictment with prejudice against the prosecutor.
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which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged violations of the Appellant’s rights.”41
The review decision does not address this aspect of the earlier decision, nor does it elaborate
as to why the diminishment of the Prosecutor’s responsibility concerning the delay in transfer
is relevant to the gravity of the violations or the remedy.
It is possible to reconcile the two decisions by concluding that whilst it is not necessary to
attribute responsibility to an organ of the Tribunal to either obtain a remedy, or trigger the
application of the abuse of process doctrine, the involvement of an organ of the ICTR would be
an aggravating circumstance, which could transform an infraction into an egregious violation.
Of note, however, is the fact that the Appeals Chamber recognized that the defendant would
be entitled to remedies other than release if the standard for release was not met. That said,
the decision lacks clarity as to whether the appeals judges considered that the violations
constituted an abuse of process (albeit of a less significant kind), but that release was not an
appropriate remedy. Another possibility is that they considered that, in light of the
diminishment of both the severity of the violations and the involvement of the Prosecutor,
there was no abuse of process, but that the defendant was nonetheless entitled to a remedy.
In terms of the continued applicability of the November 1999 decision, subsequent ICTY
and ICTR decisions have adopted varied approaches as to whether the legal findings set out
in the earlier November 1999 decision should still be considered as valid appellate precedent.
For example, in the ICTR Semanza case, which involved facts that were virtually identical to
the Barayagwiza case, the Appeals Chamber determined that there were cogent reasons for
departing from the November 1999 decision’s interpretation of Rule 40bis, and in particular,
whether it could be applied to scenarios in which the defendant is physically detained by
national authorities instead of the ICTR.42
The Appeals Chamber justified its departure on the legislative history of Rule 40bis based
on the Prosecution submission that the rule had been amended on July 4, 1996—less than
two months after its first adoption—to replace the words “30 days from the signing of the
provisional detention order” with “30 days from the day after the transfer of the suspect to the
detention unit of the Tribunal.”43 The Appeals Chamber held that this amendment evinced a
clear intention that the thirty day maximum time period for the defendant’s detention should
only commence to run once he or she had been physically transferred to the International
Tribunal.44 The impact of this interpretation on the rights of defendants can be demonstrated
by the following discrepancy between the treatment of detainees who were arrested in
accordance with the first version of Rule 40bis as compared to those who fell under the
amended Rule 40bis regime.
Before turning to that discussion, it is perhaps appropriate to underscore from the ICTR’s
First Annual Report to the United Nations that Rule 40bis was first adopted at the behest of
the Prosecutor, who advocated that there should be a power to provisionally detain suspects
prior to the filing of an indictment due to the “difficulties encountered by the Prosecutor in
41.
42.
43.
44.

Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶ 73 (Nov. 3, 1999),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.pdf.
Laurent Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, ¶ 92 (May 31, 2000),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Semanza/decisions/310500.pdf.
Id. ¶¶ 92–95.
Id. ¶ 97.

311

11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (2013)

conducting his investigation.”45 After the initial adoption of Rule 40bis, Judge Lennart
Aspergren ordered that four suspects46 detained by Cameroon be transferred to the Tribunal
to be provisionally detained, pending the filing of an indictment by the Prosecutor within
thirty days.47 In light of the continued failure of Cameroon to transfer the defendants to the
International Tribunal, two additional thirty day periods of provisional detention were
authorized.48 The third decision, which was issued by Judge Laïty Kama on July 16, 1996
(i.e., after the Rule 40bis amendment had been adopted but before it entered into force)
emphasized that Bagosora’s provisional detention in Cameroon would be extended for a third
and final period of thirty days.49 It is thus apparent that Judge Kama considered the time
limits set out in Rule 40bis to apply to provisional detention by a national authority.
The Prosecutor eventually filed its indictment against Bagosora eleven days before the
expiration of the ninety day deadline. In contrast, after the Rule 40bis amendment entered
into force, the Prosecutor did not file indictments against Barayagwiza or Semanza until after
they had been detained at the request of the Tribunal approximately eight months
respectively.50 The amendment therefore appears to have had the effect of both significantly
diluting prosecutorial diligence, and diminishing the right of the defendants to be promptly
informed of the nature and cause of the charges against them.
In terms of further discrepancies between the Semanza appellate findings and the 1999
Barayagwiza decision, the Appeals Chamber emphasized “that in any event, the Tribunal is
not responsible for the time that elapsed before the Appellant was transferred to the
Tribunal’s Detention Facility.”51 The Semanza Appeals Chamber also disregarded the
Barayagwiza dicta that it is irrelevant which entity is responsible for the violations.52 In any
event, the Appeals Chamber found that the defendant’s rights had been violated due to the
failure to promptly inform him of the charges, and the failure of the Court to dispose of his
habeas corpus motion.53 As was the case with the 2000 Barayagwiza decision, the Chamber
45.

46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

51.
52.
53.
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Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States between 1 Jan. and 31 Dec. 1994, ¶ 35,U.N. Doc. A/51/399-S/1996/778, (Sept.
24,
1996)
[hereinafter
ICTR—First
Annual
Report],
available
at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English%5CLegal%5CBilateral%20Agreement%5CEnglish%5C9625
167e.pdf.
They were Théoneste Bagosora, Ferdinand Nahimana, Anatole Nsengiyumva and André Ntagerura.
ICTR—First Annual Report, supra note 45, ¶ 36.
See Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-96-7-D, Decision: Continued Detention on
Remand of Théoneste Bagosora, (June 18, 1996), http://www.ictrcaselaw.org/docs/doc15173.pdf.
“Considering the requirements set forth in Rule 40 bis (D) of the Rules, Considering that the
Prosecutor has submitted sufficient reasons to show and justify the need for the continued detention
on remand in order to complete his investigations and criminal proceedings against Théoneste
Bagosora; Noting that Théoneste Bagosora is still detained by Cameroonian authorities and that his
transfer to the Tribunal’s Detention Unit has however not yet been implemented despite the
Tribunal’s decision of 17 May 1996: . . .” Id. at 5–6.
Laurent Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, ¶ 99 (May 31, 2000),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Semanza/decisions/310500.pdf;
Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶ 9 (Nov. 3, 1999),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.pdf.
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, ¶ 101.
Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶ 73.
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, ¶ 128.
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avoided pronouncing whether the violations could constitute an abuse of process, but stated
that “any violation, even if it entails only a relative degree of prejudice, requires a
proportionate remedy.”54
Despite these relatively strong repudiations of the 1999 Barayagwiza findings, the
Appeals Chamber performed a remarkable about-face in its 2003 decision in the ICTY Nikolic
case, and more significantly, in the 2005 Kajelijeli Appeals judgment. In Nikolic, the Appeals
Chamber addressed the following factual allegations: the accused Dragan Nikolic alleged that
he had been kidnapped by unidentified individuals in Serbia, who had then transferred him
to the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) base in Bosnia, which had jurisdiction to arrest him in
accordance with the ICTY arrest warrant.55 Although the case did not concern pre-arrest
incarceration per se, the Appeals Chamber had the opportunity to expound on the definition
and limits of the abuse of process doctrine.56
The appellate chamber first held that before considering whether the actions of the
unidentified individuals could be attributed to SFOR, it was necessary to consider whether
this type of violation would justify the Tribunal divesting itself of its personal jurisdiction
over the accused (and thereby releasing him). The Appeals Chamber reviewed domestic
jurisprudence, and concluded that for universally condemned offenses such as genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, violations of state sovereignty would not in themselves
justify setting aside personal jurisdiction.57
In terms of what violations would justify the setting aside of personal jurisdiction, the
Appeals Chamber resurrected the 1999 Barayagwiza holding that the threshold would be met
“where to exercise that jurisdiction in light of serious and egregious violations of the accused’s
rights would prove detrimental to the court’s integrity.”58 The Appeals Chamber noted that
the 2000 Barayagwiza review decision reversed the outcome of the 1999 decision, but
underscored that that decision had “confirmed its Decision of 3 November 1999 on the basis of
the facts it was founded on.”59
With respect to whether the defendant needs to attribute the violations to an organ of the
Tribunal or an entity associated with it (e.g., SFOR), the Appeals Chamber failed to expressly
address the issue. The Chamber did, however, endorse the findings of the Trial Chamber that
in terms of scenarios which “may constitute a legal impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction
over such an accused . . . [which] would certainly be the case where persons acting for SFOR
or the Prosecution were involved in such very serious mistreatment.”60 Arguably the use of
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. ¶ 125.
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning
Legality of Arrest (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 5, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/acdec/en/030605.pdf.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 24–26.
Id. ¶ 29 (quoting Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶ 74 (Nov.
3, 1999), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.pdf.).
Id. ¶ 29 n.35 (quoting Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision
(Prosecutor’s
Request
for Review or
Reconsideration), ¶ 51
(Mar.
31,
2000),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs20000331.pdf).
Id. ¶ 28 (quoting Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision on Defence Motion
Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, ¶ 114 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 9, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tdec/en/10131553.htm).
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the word “certainly” implies that the involvement of SFOR or the Prosecutor would be an
aggravating factor, but not necessarily a prerequisite. In contradistinction to the approach
followed in ICTR cases, having found that the violations of the defendant’s rights were not
sufficiently egregious to invoke the abuse of process doctrine, the Appeals Chamber did not
then proceed to consider whether the defendant had a right to lesser remedies, such as
compensation or a reduction in sentence.
The question as to whether the alleged violations need to be attributed to an organ or
entity associated with the Tribunal was much more clearly addressed by the ICTR Appeals
Chamber in its 2005 judgment in the Kajelijeli case, in which the judges decisively
rehabilitated the 1999 Barayagwiza decision, and further elaborated on the nature of
prosecutorial due diligence.61 In Kajelijeli, the Appeals Chamber found that the defendant
had been held in custody by the Benin authorities for ninety-five days prior to his transfer to
the ICTR, and that he had been in custody for eighty-five days before being served with an
arrest warrant or indictment. For this time period, the defendant should be considered to
have been a “suspect,”62 and as such, was entitled to the protection of the rights enjoyed by
suspects under the ICTR Statute and Rules.63
In line with the Semanza appellate judgment finding that Rule 40bis does not apply prior
to a defendant’s transfer to the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber noted the lacunae in the rules
concerning the manner in which states parties should implement provisional detention
requested by the Prosecutor, and the corollary lack of procedural safeguards, such as the
right to be promptly informed of the reasons for the arrest, and to be brought before a judge.64
The Appeals Chamber nonetheless emphasized that whilst “[i]t is for the requested State to
decide how to implement its obligations under international law,”65 in executing the request
for provisional detention, “the international division of labour in prosecuting crimes must not
be to the detriment of the apprehended person.”66
The Appeals Chamber instructively delineated the respective obligations of the ICTR
Prosecutor and the national authorities. Regarding the ICTR Prosecutor, once it had initiated
a case against a defendant, it had an obligation of due diligence, which would translate into a
positive obligation to ensure that the defendant’s rights were respected.67 In particular, the
Prosecutor must expressly notify the authorities of the detaining state of their duty to bring
the suspect promptly before a judge in accordance with the detaining state’s “obligation to
respect the human rights of the suspect as protected in customary international law, in the

61.
62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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Juvénal Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, ¶ 210 (May 23, 2005),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kajelijeli/judgement/appealsjudgement.doc.pdf.
The Chamber referred to the fact that under Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, a
suspect is defined as a “person concerning whom the Prosecutor possesses reliable information
which tends to show that he may have committed a crime over which the Tribunal has
jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 217.
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international treaties to which it has acceded, as well as in its own national legislation.”68 At
a minimum, a judge in the state which is detaining the suspect must:
•
•

communicate the ICTR’s request for surrender/transfer to the suspect;
familiarize the suspect with any charge;

•
•

verify the suspect’s identity, and medical status;
examine any “obvious” challenges to the case barring issues concerning the merits

•

of the case; and
notify the suspect’s consular authorities.69

At the same time, the Prosecutor must notify an ICTR judge that the suspect is being
detained by national authorities, so that the judge can prepare a provisional arrest warrant
and transfer order.70
The Appeals Chamber also expounded in detail what is meant by the suspect’s right to be
informed of the reasons for his or her arrest.71 This right is triggered as soon as the suspect is
arrested at the behest of the ICTR.72 The appellate chamber observed that under Rule 2 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, a suspect was defined as a “person concerning whom
the Prosecutor possesses reliable information which tends to show that he may have
committed a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction.”73 Since Rule 40 only permits the
Prosecutor to request the arrest of a “suspect,” it follows that the Prosecutor must at that
time possess reliable information that tends to show that the person being provisionally
arrested committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICTR.74 The appeals judges implied
that the suspect must be informed of this evidence in order to challenge whether the
conditions for provisional arrest under Rule 40 were met. However, at this point in time, the
suspect’s rights would not be violated if he was not arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant
due to the exigencies of the situation (Rule 40 does not require a judicial order from the
ICTR).75
In terms of the suspect’s status once the Prosecutor had obtained a Rule 40bis order from
an ICTR judge for transfer and provisional detention, the Appeals Chamber quoted from the
1999 Barayagwiza decision, concluding that the suspect’s right to be informed of the charges
is of paramount importance at this stage for two reasons. First, it “ ‘counterbalances the
interest of the prosecuting authority in seeking continued detention of the suspect’ by giving
the suspect ‘the opportunity to deny the offence and obtain his release prior to the initiation of
trial proceedings.’ ”76 Second, it “gives the suspect information he requires in order to prepare
his defence.”77

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. ¶ 221.
Id. ¶ 222.
Id. ¶ 217.
Id. ¶ 226.
Id. ¶ 217.
Id. ¶ 227.
Id. ¶ 226.
Id. ¶ 229 (quoting Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶¶ 80–81
(Nov. 3, 1999), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.pdf).
Id. (citing Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶¶ 80–81).
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Notably, in contrast to the position in the Semanza case that the ninety day provisional
detention maximum in Rule 40bis would not apply to provisional detention by a national
authority, the Appeals Chamber relied on the 1999 Barayagwiza decision to conclude that
provisional detention of a suspect who has not been charged would only be acceptable if it
were limited to a maximum of ninety days and the procedural safeguards in Rules 40 and
40bis are implemented.78 The Appeals Chamber also subsequently relied on the 1999
Barayagwiza decision’s finding that Rule 40 must be construed in a manner which is
consistent with the safeguards in Rule 40bis. It therefore concluded that:
[I]t is not acceptable for the Prosecution, acting alone under Rule 40, to get around
those time limits or the Tribunal’s responsibility to ensure the rights of the suspect in
provisional detention upon transfer to the Tribunal’s custody under Rules 40 and 40bis,
by using its power under Rule 40 to keep a suspect under detention in a cooperating
State.79
In this particular case, the Appeals Chamber ruled that provisional detention in Benin for
a period of eighty-five days, without being informed of the charges, and without being brought
before a judge, constituted a violation of the defendant’s rights.80 The Prosecution’s
responsibility was triggered by the fact that they failed to exercise prosecutorial diligence:
namely, the Prosecutor failed to make a timely request for the suspect’s transfer to the ICTR,
and did not request the national authorities to notify the defendant of the evidential basis for
considering him a suspect or the nature of any provisional charges.81
With regards to the fact that the defendant was not promptly brought before a judge, the
Appeals Chamber recognized that the Benin authorities were partially responsible, but
nonetheless emphasized that “although the violation is not solely attributable to the Tribunal,
it has to be recalled that it was the Prosecution, thus an organ of the Tribunal, which was the
requesting institution responsible for triggering the Appellant’s apprehension, arrest and
detention in Benin.”82 In terms of the defendant’s right to a remedy, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that since the violations were not egregious in nature, it would not be justified to
dismiss the case against the defendant; rather, a more proportionate remedy would be to
reduce the defendant’s sentence.83
This remedy of reducing the sentence to compensate for the violations should be in
addition to the reduction granted due to giving the defendant credit for time served in
provisional detention in Benin.84 In this regard, it is notable that the Trial Chamber had
granted the defendant sentencing credit for
periods during which Kajelijeli was detained solely on the basis of the Rwandan
warrant of arrest because this warrant was based on the same allegations that form the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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subject matter of this trial. In such circumstances, fairness requires that account be
taken of the total period Kajelijeli spent in custody.85
Although there have not been any further substantive appeal decisions concerning
detention by national authorities post-Kajelijeli, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has had the
opportunity to clarify whether the Prosecutor’s direct involvement in the alleged violations is
a precondition for the abuse of process doctrine in other contexts. In a decision issued in the
Karadžic case in relation to the defendant’s claim that he had been promised immunity by
representatives of the United States government, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the
Trial Chamber had erred in rejecting the applicability of the abuse of process doctrine on the
grounds that the United States’ representative was a third party who was not connected to
the ICTY.86 The Appeals Chamber also upheld the defendant’s argument that the
jurisprudence of the ICTY does “not introduce a dual standard for the abuse of process
doctrine, depending on the nature of the entity which carried out the alleged misconduct.”87
In any case, irrespective of which entity is responsible for perpetrating the violations, the
defendant must still establish that he suffered serious mistreatment or that the violations
were egregious.88
In a subsequent decision issued on February 10, 2010 in Seselj, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber expressly adopted the 1999 Barayagwiza finding that “the abuse of process doctrine
does not require the identification of the party responsible for the alleged violations of the
accused’s rights.”89 The appeals judges further clarified that
[O]nly two situations may be considered as constituting a serious and egregious
violation of the accused’s rights: (i) where a fair trial for the accused is impossible,
usually for reasons of delay; and (ii) where the trial of the accused is marred by
procedures which contravene the court’s sense of justice.90
On the basis of the jurisprudence above, pre-transfer violations could arguably fall under
either of these two categories: keeping the defendant in provisional detention for an
unreasonable length of time could trigger the first category of abuse of process, irrespective of
which entity was responsible for the delay; alternatively, if the ICTY or ICTR Prosecutor
were to deliberately abstain from requesting the suspect’s transfer to the Tribunal in a timely
manner for reasons of prosecutorial strategy (i.e., because the Prosecutor is aware it has
insufficient evidence to confirm an indictment and needs more time to gather evidence
against the suspect), this could potentially trigger the second category. The defendant may
even be entitled to sentencing credit for detention which has not been requested by the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Juvénal Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 966 (Dec. 1,
2003),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kajelijeli/judgement/031201-TC2-J-ICTR-9844A-T-JUDGEMENT%20AND%20SENTENCE-EN_.pdf.
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, Decision on Karadžic’s Appeal of Trial
Chamber’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke Agreement, ¶ 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/acdec/en/091012.pdf.
Id. ¶ 47.
Id.
Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Oral Request of the Accused for
Abuse of Process, ¶ 20 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 10, 2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tdec/en/100210a.pdf.
Id. ¶ 21.
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Tribunal, if the factual basis for his detention is similar to the allegations set out in the
court’s subsequent indictment.

B. The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is founded on complementarity: the notion that
the permanent ICC is a court of last resort which will only exercise jurisdiction over cases if
national courts are inactive, unwilling or unable to do so themselves. At the same time, as is
the case with other international courts and tribunals, the ICC is dependent on national
authorities to implement its judicial decisions and orders. This dependence raises the
practical catch-22 that, on the one hand, the ICC is assuming jurisdiction over a case because
the national authorities are either unable or unwilling to conduct the investigation in a fair
and impartial manner, but on the other hand, the ICC is dependent on the very same
national authorities to execute key steps of the judicial process. Importantly, this includes, for
example, the initial arrest and transfer of suspects and defendants. It is therefore not
surprising that many of the cases before the ICC may have had less than perfect records as
concerns the fairness and impartiality with which the defendant was treated by national
authorities. It is questionable, however, whether this political reality should inform the
prosecutorial and judicial approach taken by the Court towards such violations.
The dependency of the ICC on states is further heightened by the fact that unlike the
ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC does not ordinarily possess Chapter VII enforcement powers,91
and can thus only request assistance from states which have ratified or acceded to the Rome
Statute. The difficulty of translating a treaty-based cooperation agreement into effective
enforcement action against potentially dangerous persons was illustrated very early on at the
ICC by the failure of the Uganda government, and perhaps more pointedly by surrounding
countries, to enforce the arrest warrants against Joseph Kony and other members of the
Lord’s Resistance Army. Even worse difficulties have arisen in the situations of Sudan and
Libya, which were Chapter VII referrals. It is therefore not surprising that for the next two
cases, the Prosecutor decided to target two persons who had already been arrested and
detained by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was placed under house arrest by DRC authorities in 2004.
Subsequently, both Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain Katanga, who are allegedly
associated with opposing militia/political parties, were initially arrested by the DRC
authorities in connection with the killing of peacekeepers attached to the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in
March 2005. Although the DRC authorities eventually charged other persons with this
killing, both Lubanga and Katanga were kept in detention by the national authorities for
91.
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alleged responsibility for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity taking place
before 2004.
The DRC authorities remained in contact with the ICC Prosecutor throughout this time
period, and informed them that no investigative moves were being taken against Lubanga.92
In this connection, the ICC does not have an equivalent to the ICTY/ICTR Rule 40—the
Prosecutor does not explicitly possess the power to formally request national authorities to
provisionally detain a suspect, pending the issuance of an arrest warrant by the Court. At the
same time, the Statute and Rules do not prohibit the Prosecutor from informally
communicating such a wish to national authorities.
In January 2006, the ICC Prosecutor filed an application for an arrest warrant against
Lubanga.93 In terms of the timing of the application, the Prosecutor noted that under DRC
law, the defendant had a right to be brought before a judge within twelve months of his initial
arrest. The ICC Prosecution was therefore concerned that “the apparent absence of
investigative acts performed since the arrest of Thomas LUBANGA DYILO [would provide]
sufficient legal basis for that judge to authorize his release.”94 The Pre-Trial Chamber
eventually granted the application, and, subsequent to his transfer to the ICC, the defense
challenged the jurisdiction of the court and sought the defendant’s release on the basis that
his arbitrary detention in the DRC constituted an abuse of process.95 The defense also argued
in the alternative, that even if the violations were not sufficiently grave to warrant the
cessation of the proceedings, the Chamber should nonetheless grant an appropriate remedy.
For instance, in its submission, the Chamber should take into consideration his prior
detention in the DRC when considering his eligibility for provisional release.96
On appeal,97 the Appeals Chamber held that while the Statute and Rules did not explicitly
provide for any legal basis under which the proceedings could be stayed due to an abuse of
process, Article 21(3) of the Statute mandate that the Chamber apply the provisions of the
Rome Statute in a manner that is consistent with internationally recognized human rights
norms.98 The appeals judges referred to the overriding obligation under human rights law to
ensure that the proceedings as a whole were fair, and concluded that “[w]here fair trial
becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect or the
accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to put the person on trial.”99
92.
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Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Defence Appeal against the
Decision on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3 October 2006, ¶ 32 (Oct. 26, 2006),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc243795.pdf.
Id.
Id. ¶ 33 (quoting Prosecutor’s Further Information and Materials, ¶ 13, Jan. 25, 2006) (alteration in
original).
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 53–58.
The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the challenge on the basis that the defense had failed to establish
either that the defendant had suffered from an egregious violation of his rights amounting to torture
or serious mistreatment, or that there had been concerted action between the DRC authorities and
the ICC Prosecution.
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), Judgment on the Appeal of
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the
Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 36 (Dec. 14, 2006),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc243774.pdf.
Id. ¶ 37.
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Accordingly, “[w]here the breaches of the rights of the accused are such as to make it
impossible for him/her to make his/her defence within the framework of his rights, no fair
trial can take place and the proceedings can be stayed.”100
Regrettably, the ICC Appeals Chamber did not clearly delineate what type of
circumstances would render it impossible to have a fair trial. For example, it is possible that
the defendant could suffer egregious violations of his rights in connection with his arrest and
detention by national authorities. The subsequent proceedings conducted before the ICC
might nonetheless be conducted in a fair manner. Would it be possible to conclude that the
proceedings as a whole were fair, or would the earlier violations taint the fairness of the
entire trial? The ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence is clearer in this respect as it specifies that the
courts will consider the violations to constitute an abuse of process either if it is no longer
possible to convene a fair trial, or the violations have contravened the tribunal’s sense of
justice.
The judgment is also opaque concerning whether the defendant must prove that the
violations of his rights can be attributed to the ICC itself. The Appeals Chamber notes that
the defense had failed to demonstrate that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusion that there was
no concerted action between the DRC and the ICC Prosecutor was erroneous, but the Appeals
Chamber does not then clarify whether it was actually necessary for the defense to prove the
existence of concerted action.101 In this regard, the Appeals Chamber does not squarely
address the issue of due diligence, which is separate from the issue of responsibility. Although
obviously not binding at the ICC in a technical sense, there was no consideration of the ICTR
Kajelijeli appeals decision which would have been instructive. The judges failed to take up the
issue of whether the Prosecution, even if it had not been involved in the violations of the
defendant’s rights, had a positive obligation to minimize these violations, for example, by
applying for the defendant’s arrest warrant in a timely manner.
Finally, and perhaps even more egregiously, the decision does not consider whether the
defendant should have been entitled to an alternative remedy—for example, a reduction in
sentence, or compensation as is required by Article 85(1) of the Rome Statute, which provides
that “[a]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an
enforceable right to compensation.”102 The Appeals Chamber simply notes that “the crimes for
which Mr. Lubanga Dyilo was detained by the Congolese authority were separate and
distinct from those which led to the issuance of the warrant for his arrest.”103 Since other
provisions of the Statute, which address the relationship of ICC proceedings to domestic
proceedings, refer to “conduct” and not “crimes,”104 it is unfortunate that the Appeals
100. Id. ¶ 39.
101. Id. ¶ 42.
102. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 85, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a84.html.
103. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article
19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 42.
104. For example, Article 20, which sets out the principles concerning ne bis in idem, refers to “conduct”:
“No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7, 8 or 8
bis shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct . . . .” Rome Statute, supra note 102,
art. 20(3).

320

Provisional Arrest and Incarceration

Chamber appears to have adopted a narrower requirement that the defendant must prove
that there is a correlation between the specific crimes underlying the domestic proceedings
and those of the ICC. In some cases, it may be impossible for the defendant to prove such a
correlation.
For example, Lubanga had not been detained by the Congolese authorities for any specific
crimes, which was itself a violation of his right to be informed of the nature of the charges for
which he had been detained. In the absence of any details concerning the factual basis for his
detention in the DRC, it would be difficult for him to draw a specific correlation between the
national proceedings and the ICC charges. It is also apparent that the DRC authorities
considered that the transfer of the defendant to the ICC effectively closed the proceedings in
the DRC.105 As such, absent any possible remedial action through regional or international
human rights complaint processes, the ICC would be the only court before which the
defendant would be entitled to seek a remedy in connection with his allegations of arbitrary
detention.
The failure of either the Pre-Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber to discuss the notion
of due diligence within the context of the rights of suspects who have been apprehended and
detained by national authorities is particularly disappointing given that the Pre-Trial
Chambers have a record of actively policing the investigations of the Prosecutor in order to
enforce the rights of putative victims.106 It is also arguable that, by failing to set out
standards of prosecutorial due diligence and effectively looking the other way, the Appeals
Chamber placed its imprimatur on the practice of detaining possible ICC suspects in domestic
prisons indefinitely or until such time that the Prosecutor decided to file an application for an
ICC arrest warrant against the suspect in question.
The impact this had on the proceedings is exemplified by the decision of the Prosecutor not
to apply for an arrest warrant against Germain Katanga until June 25, 2007, even though
the Prosecution was aware that he had been in detention since March 2005. In this case,
there was a clearer correlation between the domestic proceedings and the ICC case, as
demonstrated by the fact that the ICC Prosecution was relying on statements taken by
national authorities from the defendant whilst he was in detention.107 Nonetheless, the
question whether the defendant should have a remedy for the alleged violations of his rights
was never addressed on the merits, as the Pre-Trial Chamber held that the defense had filed
its application too late (even though there is no deadline for abuse of process motions in the
105. The Auditor General closed the proceedings in order to avoid ne bis in idem and transferred all the
case file documents to the ICC Prosecutor. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06, Defence Appeal against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to Jurisdiction of 3
October 2006, ¶ 31 (Oct. 26, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc243795.pdf.
106. For example, at the same time that the Pre-Trial Chamber was considering the application of the
Prosecution for an arrest warrant against Lubanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a landmark
decision in the DRC situation to the effect that victims had a right to participate in the
investigations stage of the proceedings. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. ICC01/04, Public Redacted Version: Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of
VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183441.PDF.
107. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Public
Redacted Version: Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 79–99 (Sept. 30, 2008),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf.
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Statute or Rules, and the Chamber had not set a specific deadline for filing the motion).108
This decision to dismiss the application on procedural grounds was narrowly upheld by the
Appeals Chamber.109 There are, however, two very powerful and well-reasoned dissenting
opinions from Judges Kourula and Trendafilova concerning the effect of such a decision on
the defendant’s right of access to a court and right to an effective remedy.110
More recently, in the case involving former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo, the accused
requested a stay of proceedings in a preliminary motion challenging the ICC’s jurisdiction. He
argued that because his fundamental fair trial rights were violated by Ivorian authorities,
between the period of his arrest on April 11, 2011 and his transfer to the Court on November
29, 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber should decline to exercise its jurisdiction and order a
permanent cessation of the proceedings against him.111 He claimed, inter alia, that he had
been arbitrarily arrested, detained, and tortured by the national authorities and that the
Prosecutor, who was in contact with those entities, was effectively complicit in his
mistreatment insofar as she could have but failed to request the Ivory Coast to end the grave
violations of his rights.112
In its decision, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that, although this aspect of Gbagbo’s
motion did not in fact constitute a valid jurisdictional challenge, it would still exercise its
jurisdiction to hear the matter given the seriousness of the defense allegations and the PreTrial Chamber’s inherent power to stay proceedings in cases of abuse of process.113 The
judges then examined the merits of the defense motion but concluded that the Ivorian
authorities had not detained the defendant at the ICC Prosecutor’s behest or that of another
organ of the Court.114 This implied that, had that been the case, the Pre-Trial Chamber would
have likely assessed the role that the ICC entity played in impacting the defendant’s rights
through the action of the national authorities. Indeed, the judges ruled that the defense failed
to proffer relevant evidence substantiating the claim that the ICC Prosecutor had something
to do with Gbagbo’s arrest, charge, and detention in his home country. They observed that

108. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Public
Redacted Version of the “Decision on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a
Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of Proceedings” of 20 November 2009 (ICC-01/0401/07-1666-Conf-Exp), (Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc827868.pdf.
109. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 10,
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Katanga against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 20 November
2009 Entitled “Decision on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on
Unlawful Detention and Stay of Proceedings” (July 12, 2010), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907224.pdf.
110. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 10,
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Katanga against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 20 November
2009 Entitled “Decision on the Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on
Unlawful Detention and Stay of Proceedings,” Dissenting Opinion, (July 12, 2010), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc914982.pdf.
111. Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision on the “Corrigendum of the
Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the Basis of Articles 12(3),
19(2), 21(3), 55 and 59 of the Rome Statute Filed by the Defence for President Gbagbo (ICC- 02/1101/11-129),” ¶¶ 10, 68, 76 (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1454492.pdf.
112. Id. ¶¶ 68–76.
113. Id. ¶¶ 88–90.
114. Id. ¶ 97.
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even the defense had conceded that these steps had no apparent link to the proceedings
before the Court because they related to economic crimes.115
Presumably, if the arrest had been attributable to an ICC organ, some type of remedy
would have accrued if the judges determined that there had been a serious violation of his
rights. In contrast, when the Prosecutor actually requested that the national authorities
arrest him, the Chamber observed that the suspect’s rights, including the fundamental ones
to be informed of the charges against him and to be brought before a national judge, were
respected. This took place only four days from the date of transmission of the Court’s official
request that the Ivorian authorities effect his arrest—the moment from which they would
consider that he had been detained pursuant to the ICC Prosecutor’s—and therefore the
Court’s—authority.116
Unfortunately, upon appeal of the decision denying a stay of proceedings, the Appeals
Chamber dismissed Gbagbo’s request for a reversal of the Pre-Trial Chamber in limine.117
The presiding judge determined that the impugned decision, which was not a decision about
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 82(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, could have only been appealed
with leave of the Pre-Trial Chamber which the defense never sought and obtained as required
by Article 82(1)(d).118
In its recent Gbagbo decision, in which it invoked procedural irregularities to dismiss the
defense appeal, the Appeals Chamber denied itself the opportunity of clarifying the
ambiguities in its earlier decisions, for example, whether it would be necessary for the
defense to establish the existence of concerted action between the ICC and the national organ,
and if so, the degree of violation that would be required for the purposes of triggering the
imputation of responsibility to the ICC organ. Indeed, it is notable that other courts, for
instance the ECCC in the Duch case which will be discussed below, had interpreted the
Lubanga decision to support a broad form of responsibility for pre-transfer violations of the
defendant’s rights. The Pre-Trial Chamber decision in Gbagbo, which showed sensitivity to
the human rights of the defendant, also arguably follows this broad tend.

C. The Practice of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia
The first suspect to be arrested by Cambodian authorities in connection with the alleged
crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge became the unfortunate victim of the protracted
bureaucratic wrangling between Cambodian and U.N. officials concerning the legal details for
establishing a tribunal to prosecute these alleged crimes. The defendant Kaing Guek Eav
(alias “Duch”) was arrested by Cambodian authorities in May 1999 pursuant to an arrest
warrant issued by the Military Court.119 The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary
115. Id. ¶¶ 97–98.
116. Id. ¶ 102.
117. Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11 OA 2, Judgment on the Appeal of
Mr. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on Jurisdiction and Stay
of the Proceedings, ¶¶ 101, 106 (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1526463.pdf.
118. Id.
119. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch,” Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (PTC01),
Decision on Appeal against Provisional Detention Order of Kaing Guek Eav Alias “Duch,” ¶ 13 (Dec.
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Chambers in the Courts in Cambodia (ECCC Law) entered into force on August 10, 2001, but
the Court was not yet physically established at that point in time.120 From 2002 until 2007,
the Military Court issued orders for his detention based on the ECCC Law. On July 30, 2007,
the defendant was physically transferred to the ECCC Detention Unit pursuant to an order of
the ECCC co-investigating judges.121 The defendant was thus held in detention by national
authorities for more than eight years prior to the commencement of his case before the ECCC.
The defense argued that this prior detention violated Article 9 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),122 and should be imputed to the ECCC
judicial authorities. The investigating judge should therefore have taken this time period into
consideration when determining whether it was appropriate to order his continued
provisional detention.123 The defense did not, however, seek the termination of the case on
this basis.
The co-investigating judges dismissed the arguments on the grounds that the ECCC had
no jurisdiction to consider the legality of his detention prior to the establishment of the
ECCC.124 On appeal, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that it would only be able to take into
account violations of Article 9 of the ICCPR if “the organ responsible for the violation was
connected to an organ of the ECCC, or had been acting on behalf of any organ of the ECCC or

3,
2007),
http://203.176.141.125/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/PTC_decision_appeal_duch_C545_EN_0_0.pdf.
120. See Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Oct. 27, 2004,
NS/RKM/1004/006,
available
at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf.
121. This procedural history is recounted at paragraphs 2–4 of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Request
for Release, dated June 15, 2009. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch,” Case File No. 001/1807-2007/ECCC/TC, Decision on Request for Release, ¶¶ 2–4 (June 15, 2009),
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%20Documents/ECCC/Duch_Decision_on_Request_for
_Release.pdf.
122. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 9.
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on
such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons
for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees
to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise,
for execution of the judgment.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to
take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an
enforceable right to compensation.
Id.
123. Duch, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (PTC01), Decision on Appeal against Provisional
Detention Order of Kaing Guek Eav Alias “Duch,” ¶ 13.
124. Id.
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in concert with organs of the ECCC.”125 The Pre-Trial Chamber then proceeded to examine
the relationship between the ECCC and domestic authorities, in particular, the Military
Court that had ordered the defendant’s arrest. The Chamber observed that the applicable law
before the ECCC did not give the ECCC jurisdiction over actions by domestic courts.126 There
were also several distinctions between the ECCC and domestic courts, for example, the ECCC
Chambers were composed of both national and foreign judges, whom would not be eligible to
sit in Cambodian courts.127
Of greater relevance, the Chamber also emphasized that the ECCC should be considered
to be an independent entity from the Cambodian court system: decisions of the ECCC cannot
be reviewed by any court outside its structure, and there is no corresponding right for the
ECCC to review decisions made by domestic courts.128 The Chamber ultimately concluded
that the co-investigating judges did not err in excluding this period of detention from their
consideration as to whether it was necessary to order the continued detention of the
defendant under Rule 63(3) of the Internal Rules.129 The defense resurrected the issue before
the Trial Chamber in conjunction with a request for release, in which the defendant further
requested that his prior detention be taken into consideration for sentencing purposes, and
that this should include a reduction to compensate him for the violation of his rights.
The Trial Chamber confirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s finding that the ECCC was a
specialized court which operated independently from the Cambodian court system.130 The
Chamber therefore held that neither the fact that the Military Court had cited ECCC law in
its detention order, nor the fact that it had issued an order terminating the case subsequent
to the defendant’s transfer to the ECCC demonstrated that there was any continuity between
the acts of the Military Court and the ECCC.131
In contrast to the finding of the Pre-Trial Chamber that the ECCC would only have
jurisdiction to rule on these alleged violations if they could in same way be attributed to the
ECCC, the Trial Chamber noted its obligation to apply its internal rules in a manner
consistent with international standards set out in human rights conventions. The judges also
considered the jurisprudence of international courts, and surmised that “[e]ven if a violation
of the Accused’s right cannot be attributed to the ECCC, international jurisprudence
indicates that an international criminal tribunal has both the authority and the obligation to
consider the legality of his prior detention.”132 The Chamber expressly cited the 1999
Barayagwiza decision in support of this conclusion.133

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
Id. ¶ 23.
Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch,” Case File No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Decision on
Request
for
Release,
¶¶ 10–11
(June
15,
2009),
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%20Documents/ECCC/Duch_Decision_on_Request_for
_Release.pdf.
131. Id. ¶¶ 13–14.
132. Id. ¶ 16.
133. Id.
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Later in the decision, the Chamber made a valiant attempt to reconcile the disparate
jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC concerning the relationship between the
defendant’s right to a remedy and the abuse of process doctrine. The Chamber firstly cited a
2000 ICTR Rwamakuba Trial Chamber decision to the effect that violations of a defendant’s
rights will only be attributed to the tribunal if there has been concerted action between it and
the national authorities.134 However, even if there has been no concerted action, the Trial
Chamber found that the abuse of process doctrine constitutes an additional safeguard, in that
the Court may be required to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant if there have
been fundamental breaches of the rights of the accused that rendered a fair trial impossible,
or serious mistreatment, irrespective of the identity of the authority of the violations.135
Finally, the Chamber noted that even if the violations did not reach the standard of an
abuse of process, in accordance with the case law of the ICTR Appeals Chamber, the
defendant might still have a right to a remedy other than termination of the case for
violations committed by the national authorities.136 This right to a remedy was generally
addressed at the sentencing stage, and was comprised of sentencing credit for both the time
which the defendant had spent in detention by the national authorities, and additional credit
to separately compensate for the violations.137 If the defendant was acquitted, he would have
to seek compensation before national authorities.
In examining the facts, the Trial Chamber held that under Cambodian law, the defendant
could only be detained for a maximum of three years for genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.138 In addition, the case file revealed a lack of investigative activity and a
lack of factual reasoning in the detention orders.139 The Military Court also applied several
laws on a retrospective basis.140 The Chamber therefore concluded that the defendant’s prior
detention violated both Cambodian law, the defendant’s right to trial within a reasonable
time, and his right to be detained in accordance with the law.141
In terms of appropriate remedies, the Chamber made two main observations. First, if the
defendant had been tried by the Military Court, he would have been entitled to sentencing
credit for the time during which he was detained pursuant to the orders of the Military
Court.142 Second, the defendant had been detained by the Military Court for “investigation of
allegations broadly similar to those being considered in this trial.”143 The Chamber therefore
decided that the defendant should be granted sentencing credit for the entire duration of his

134. Id. ¶ 32 (citing Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, “Decision on the Defence Motion
Concerning the Illegal Arrest and Illegal Detention of the Accused,” ¶ 30 (Dec. 12, 2000).
135. Id. ¶ 33 (citing Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶ 73 (Nov. 3, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to
Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶¶ 30, 37 (Dec. 14, 2006).
136. Id. ¶ 35 (citing Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision (Nov. 3, 1999).
137. Id. ¶ 37.
138. Id.
139. Id. ¶ 20.
140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 21.
142. Id. ¶ 28.
143. Id.
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detention under the authority of the Military Court.144 In its final judgment, the Trial
Chamber also assessed that he should be granted a reduction in sentence of five years in
order to separately compensate him for the violations of his rights which had occurred during
this time period.145
Although the Co-Prosecutors neither objected to nor appealed this aspect of the Trial
Chamber’s sentence and its disposition, in their February 2012 judgment, the Supreme Court
Chamber of the ECCC reviewed the issue ex proprio motu as a question of law.146 It deemed
this appropriate as they amended Duch’s sentence upwards. The judges then discussed the
matter and determined that the Trial Chamber had misconstrued the law when it held, on
the basis of an erroneous interpretation of the ICTR jurisprudence, that Duch could be
entitled to a remedy even in 1) the absence of violations attributable to the ECCC and 2) in
the absence of a showing of abuse of process.147
To the contrary, after a review primarily of the Barayagwiza, Semanza, Kajelijeli, and
Rwamakuba decisions discussed above, the majority ruled that the Trial Chamber should
have rejected the defendant’s request for a remedy. It explained that at least some form of
responsibility should accrue to the ECCC for such a measure to be justified.148 In the final
analysis, it explained, the ICTR case law establishes that “violations of human rights must
either constitute an abuse of process or be attributed to the Tribunal in order to grant the
accused a remedy, and also that such remedies have always been granted in connection to
failures by the Prosecutor or another organ of the Tribunal.”149
However, in a lucid partial dissenting opinion, Judges Klonowiecka-Milart and Jayasinghe
argued that the majority’s adoption of ad hoc tribunal case law and application to the ECCC
context was both unnecessary and inappropriate. In particular, the majority had failed to
take into account the legal character of the ECCC as a hybrid court in respect of which there
was “shared responsibility” distinct from the standalone nature of the ICTY and the ICTR
which therefore enjoyed some distance from national jurisdictions.150 The Cambodia situation
was different and raises a separate question as to whether a hybrid court ought to be held
accountable for the actions of the domestic system in instances where the former benefitted
from the actions of the institutions associated with the national jurisdiction.151 In Duch’s case,
144. Id.
145. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch,” Case File No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment,
¶ 680
(July
26,
2010),
http://www.ivr.uzh.ch/institutsmitglieder/kaufmann/Projekte/ECCCMonitoringProgram/Berichterst
attung/Case001TrialJudgementEn.pdf.
146. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch,” Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeals
Judgment,
¶ 389
(Feb.
3,
2012),
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/documents/Case%20001%20Appeal%20Judgeme
nt%20FINAL%20EN.pdf.
147. Id. ¶¶ 390, 395.
148. Id. ¶ 398.
149. Id.
150. See Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch,” Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Partially
Dissenting Joint Opinion of Judges Agnieszka Klonowiecka-Milart and Chandra Nihal Jayasinghe,
¶7
(Feb.
3,
2012),
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/documents/Case%20001%20Appeal%20Judgeme
nt%20FINAL%20EN.pdf.
151. See id.
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according to the dissenters, this was due to his detention by the military authorities. They
then advanced several factors, all of which militated in favor of granting a remedy to the
defendant in that particular case. The key considerations included (i) the extent to which the
sentencing court is integrated into the domestic system; (ii) the nexus between the violation
and the proceedings before the sentencing court; (iii) the gravity of the violation, which must
rise to a violation of fundamental rights; (iv) whether an appropriate remedy is within the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court; and (v) whether granting the remedy would frustrate the
mandate of the sentencing court by, for example, requiring the immediate release of the
defendant.152
Based on an analysis of these factors, the partially dissenting judges concluded that the
ECCC was obligated to consider its responsibility for the Military Court’s detention of Duch
before his transfer to ECCC custody. Ultimately, they considered it more compatible with
international human rights law for the tribunal to grant the sentencing reduction and
imprison him for thirty years instead of increasing his sentence to life imprisonment.
Importantly, the dissent recognized that the defendant would otherwise have been left
without a remedy even in the face of a flagrant violation of his rights.153

D. The Practice of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) shares some of the same attributes of the
preceding courts and tribunals, in particular, its dependence on national authorities for
arresting and transferring suspects to the court’s custody. Moreover, as was the case with the
ECCC, the national authorities took action against specific suspects before the tribunal was
fully operational, with a view to eventually transferring the suspects to the STL. Four
Lebanese generals—Messrs. Jamil Mohamad Amin El Sayed, Ali Salah El Dine El Hajj,
Raymond Fouad Azar and Mr Mostafa Fehmi Hamdan—were detained on August 30,
2005.154
The early jurisprudence and practice of the STL has, however, departed from its
institutional antecedents in that all the organs—the Prosecutor, President, Pre-Trial Judge
and Defence Office—have proactively taken measures to ensure that there were no gaps
concerning the enforcement of the suspects’ rights. For instance, they seem to have tried to
ensure that the suspects’ rights concerning the conditions of detention were respected (even
though they were not physically within the custody of the Tribunal), that the suspects were
not arbitrarily detained, and that they be accorded a remedy for any violations of their rights.
As concerns the defendant’s protection against arbitrary detention, on March 25, 2009, the
Prosecutor filed a request that the Pre-Trial Judge order the Lebanese authorities to defer to
the competence of the STL, and to hand over the results of the investigations and the list of

152. Id. ¶ 8.
153. Id.
154. Application by the Prosecutor to the Pre-Trial Judge under Article 4(2) of the Statute and Rule 17 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, No. OTP/PTJ/2009/001 (Special Trib. for Lebanon Mar. 25,
2009),
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/miscellaneaous/filings/other-filings/office-of-theprosecutor/application-by-the-prosecutor-to-the-pre-trial-judge-under-article-42-of-the-statute-andrule-17-of-the-rules-of-procedure-and-e.
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detained persons to the STL.155 The Pre-Trial Judge granted this request on March 27, 2009,
and further ordered the Lebanese authorities, in accordance with Rule 17, “to continue to
detain those persons held in Lebanon in connection with the case from the time of the
Prosecutor’s receipt of the results of the investigation by the Lebanese authority and the copy
of the Lebanese court records until the issuance of a decision by the Pre-Trial Judge.”156
On April 15, 2009, the Pre-Trial Judge issued an order which held that although the four
detainees were physically detained by the Lebanese authorities, they should nonetheless be
considered to be detained under the authority of the STL as of April 10, 2009, which was the
date that the Lebanese authorities transferred the results of their investigation.157 At the
same time, the Pre-Trial Judge established a stringent deadline (April 27, 2009) by which the
Prosecutor was to file a reasoned application as to whether he requested the continued
detention of the four suspects.158
On April 21, 2009, in response to an application by the Defence Office, the President
issued an order that considered the conditions of detention of the four suspects, namely the
fact that they were being segregated from all other detainees (which amounts to de facto
isolation) and had been denied the right to privileged communications with their counsel.159
The President noted that the Tribunal’s Rules of Detention only applied to persons who were
physically detained by the Tribunal, and as such, were formally inapplicable in light of the
fact that the suspects were detained in Lebanon. The President nonetheless opined that “the
Tribunal must be able to exercise some form of supervision over their detention. Without such
supervision by the Tribunal, the rights of the detained persons may be gravely compromised
and they may be left without any effective remedy against a potential violation of their
rights.”160 Notably, the President cited the Kajelijeli appeals judgment in support of this
proposition.161
The President therefore relied on his general obligation under Rule 32(2) to supervise
conditions of detention, and his power under Rule 101(G), which allows the President to
request the modification of conditions of detention for persons detained outside of the Host
State (i.e., the Netherlands).162 He therefore ordered the Lebanese authorities “to ensure that
the right of the detained persons to freely and privately communicate with their counsel be
155. Id.
156. Antonio Cassese, Guido Acquaviva, Mary Fan & Alex Whiting, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 44 (2011), (citing Order Directing the Lebanese Judicial Authorities
Seized with the Case of the Attack against Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others to Defer to the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/01 (Special Trib. for Lebanon Mar. 27, 2009),
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/miscellaneaous/filings/orders-and-decisions/pre-trialjudge/ordonnance-portant-des-saisissement-en-faveur-du-tribunal-special-pour-le-liban-de-lajuridiction-libanaise-saisie-de-laffaire-de).
157. Order Setting a Time Limit for Filing of an Application by the Prosecutor in Accordance with Rule
17(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/03 (Special Trib. for Lebanon
Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/miscellaneaous/filings/orders-and-decisions/pretrial-judge/ordonnance-portant-fixation-du-delai-de-depot-de-la-requete-du-procureur-enapplication-de-larticle-17-paragraph-b-du-reglement-de.
158. Id.
159. Order on Conditions of Detention, Case No. CH/PRES/2009/01/rev (Special Trib. for Lebanon Apr.
21, 2009), http://www.worldcourts.com/stl/eng/decisions/2009.04.21_In_the_Matter_of_El_Sayed.pdf.
160. Id. ¶ 10.
161. Id. ¶ 10 n.7.
162. Id. ¶ 11.
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fully implemented,” and “to terminate the regime of segregation of the detained persons and
to ensure that, in keeping with any security regime deemed appropriate, the detained persons
be allowed to communicate with each other upon request, for a period of two hours per
day.”163
In response to the deadline set by the Pre-Trial Judge for the Prosecutor to request the
continued detention of the four suspects, the Prosecutor filed a motion, in which he informed
the Pre-Trial Judge that the information which was currently available was insufficiently
credible to warrant the indictment of the four suspects.164 The Prosecutor noted that under
the Rules, a suspect could not be detained for more than ninety days unless an indictment
was confirmed against the suspect, and therefore requested that the suspects be released
immediately.165 The Pre-Trial Judge granted the request.166
Not surprisingly, given the fact that he had been kept in detention without being charged
for four years, one of the released suspects, Mr. Jamil El Sayed, subsequently attempted to
obtain a remedy in domestic courts under Lebanese laws concerning libelous denunciation
and arbitrary detention. In order to sustain such a claim, and in light of the fact that the
investigative files had been transferred to the STL, Mr. Sayed filed a request before the
Tribunal to obtain information concerning the circumstances of his initial detention by
Lebanese authorities.
In the Pre-Trial Judge’s decision, the judge held that whilst neither the Statute nor the
Rules provide for an explicit right to access the documents concerning a person’s detention,
the power to grant access to such documents should be considered to fall within the implicit
powers of the Tribunal, as the request was closely connected to the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, and it would be consistent with the “interests of fairness of the proceedings
and good administration of justice.”167 The Judge further emphasized that since the Lebanese
authorities’ deferral to the competence of the court on April 10, 2009, the STL was the sole
court with jurisdiction over the events in question, and the only court with access to the
documentation.168 Moreover, if the Tribunal were to find that it did not have jurisdiction over
the request, “the Tribunal would deprive the Applicant of any possibility to have his basic
rights vindicated by a judge. It would thus exclude the Applicant from the right to effective
judicial protection.”169

163. Id. at 11–12.
164. Submission of the Prosecutor to the Pre-Trial Judge Under Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/004 (Special Trib. for Lebanon Apr. 27, 2009),
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%20Documents/STL/STL_Reasoned%20submission%2
0as%20filed_270409.pdf.
165. Id. ¶ 22.
166. Order Regarding the Detention of Persons Detained in Lebanon in Connection with the Case of the
Attack against Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and Others, Case No. CH/PTJ/2009/06 (Special Trib. for
Lebanon Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%20Documents/STL/OrderRegarding-the-Detention-of-Persons-Detained-in-Lebanon.pdf.
167. Order Relating to the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to Rule on the Application by Mr. El Sayed Dated
17 March 2010 and Whether Mr. El Sayed Has Standing before the Tribunal, ¶ 32, Case No.
CH/PTJ/2010/005
(Special
Trib.
for
Lebanon
Sept.
17,
2010),
http://www.worldcourts.com/stl/eng/decisions/2010.09.17_In_the_Matter_of_El_Sayed.pdf.
168. Id. ¶ 34.
169. Id. ¶ 35.

330

Provisional Arrest and Incarceration

The Pre-Trial Judge thus concluded that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the request,
and furthermore, that the applicant had standing to request the relief sought from the
Tribunal even though he was no longer a party to the proceedings. Having determined these
threshold issues, as of writing, the judge is receiving observations from the Prosecutor and
the Applicant concerning the merits of his request for access to the case file. In November
2010, the Special Tribunal also amended its Rules of Procedure and Evidence to provide that
anyone who has been “illegally arrested or detained under the authority of the Tribunal as a
result of a serious miscarriage of justice, . . . may file a request to the President for
compensation or other appropriate redress within six months of the issuance of the final
judgment or decision.”170

III.

Conclusion and Recommendations
It is encouraging that the jurisprudence of the different courts and tribunals has gradually

evolved in a positive manner, towards recognition that “the international division of labour in
prosecuting crimes must not be to the detriment of the apprehended person,”171 and that any
violations of the defendant’s rights requires a remedy even if the threshold for release has not
been met. According to the above jurisprudence of the different courts, the position of a
defendant, who has been arbitrarily detained by national authorities, may be summarized as
follows.
First, if the Prosecutor/investigating authority is aware that a person suspected of crimes
falling under the jurisdiction of the court/tribunal had been arrested by national authorities,
they have a positive duty to notify the court/tribunal, and inform national authorities of their
duty to ensure that the rights of the defendant are respected.172 Second, once the Prosecutor
has requested the arrest of the defendant or assumed jurisdiction over the case, even if the
defendant is detained by national authorities and not at the seat of the court, the defendant
should not be detained for more than ninety days prior to the issuance of an indictment.
Third, the court will likely find that there has been an abuse of process if the violations of the
defendant’s rights have rendered it impossible to have a fair trial. Fourth, the court will also
be likely to find that there has been an abuse of process if the procedures have been tainted to
such an extent that it offends the court’s sense of justice. Fifth, the defendant does not need to
establish the existence of concerted action between the organs of the court and the national
authorities, but such concerted action could be an aggravating factor, or it could be the factor
which offends the court’s sense of justice, which places the violation in the second category of
abuse of process.
Sixth, in order to trigger the abuse of process doctrine or to justify the release of the
defendant, the violations must be egregious. The ICC has held that the severity of the
violations is not necessarily relevant—what is more relevant is whether it is possible to
170. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 170(D), entered into force Mar.
20, 2009, available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/images/RPE/RPE_EN_February_2013.pdf.
171. Juvénal Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, ¶ 220 (May 23, 2005),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kajelijeli/judgement/appealsjudgement.doc.pdf.
172. The ICTY has not pronounced on this issue, but would presumably follow the ICTR. The Pre-Trial
Judge at the STL has exercised this role, and the ICC and ECCC have not set out any due diligence
standards as concerns pre-transfer detention.
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convene a fair trial.173 Seventh, even if the threshold for an abuse of process has not been
met, the defendant will still have a right to a remedy for any violations of his rights. Eighth, if
the defendant is convicted, the defendant will be entitled to sentencing credit for the time for
which he was detained at the request of the court/tribunal, and also any time for which he
was detained in connection with “broadly similar allegations,” even if the court/tribunal had
not requested his detention. Finally, in addition to credit for time served, the defendant is
also entitled separately to a reduction of his or her sentence as a remedy for the violation
itself. Article 85(1) of the Rome Statute provides that “[a]nyone who has been the victim of
unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”174 It is not
clear whether the right to compensation will only include financial compensation or could also
include a sentence reduction if the defendant is convicted. The broader interpretation, which
enables this right to include both the possibility of a financial award and reduction in jail
term, ought to be preferred.
At the same time, notwithstanding the above, it is also possible to discern the following
relatively more negative trends. First, the courts have been highly influenced by the realities
of state/international cooperation, which weakens the likelihood that they would offer strong
remedies to a defendant whose rights have been violated. Second, the imposition of rigid
procedural and evidentiary requirements can render the right to a remedy illusory. Third,
whilst the courts have not explicitly required the defendant to demonstrate concerted action
between the international/hybrid court and national authorities, the absence of such
concerted action is likely to impact the court’s assessment as to whether the violation is
linked to the proceedings before the court, and whether the violation is sufficiently grave to
warrant a remedy. Fourth, the practice of the courts in granting the defendant a reduction in
sentence as a remedy is unlikely to have any deterrent effects against the Prosecutor or
national authorities pursuing such practices in the future. Fifth, as recognized by the 1999
Barayagwiza decision, financial compensation cannot compensate an acquitted person for the
loss of family life which he or she has experienced whilst being arbitrarily detained. It is
therefore disappointing that the ICC in particular has not established any standards of
prosecutorial diligence which would minimize the possibility of such violations occurring in
the future.
In light of the above analysis and conclusions, the authors therefore propose the following
recommendations:
173. Rome Statute, supra note 102, art. 85(1).
174. In the Lubanga Appeals Chamber judgment of December 14, 2006, the ICC Appeals Chamber found
that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s focus on the severity of the violations was irrelevant:
As may be discerned from the principles identified in the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber
as relevant to stay of proceedings, a broader standard was adopted than the one warranted
in law in that it failed to require the specific consideration of whether a fair trial remained
possible in the particular circumstances of the case. The findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber
to the effect that the appellant was not subjected to any ill-treatment in the process of his
arrest and conveyance before the Court sidelines the importance of the precise ambit of the
test applied as a guide to the resolution of this appeal.
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA4), Judgment on the Appeal of
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the
Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 40 (Dec. 14, 2006),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc243774.pdf.
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•

If the Prosecutor becomes aware that national authorities have detained a person
who could be considered a suspect falling under the respective international
court/tribunal’s jurisdiction, she should inform the national authorities of its duty
to ensure that the rights of this suspect—as set out in national legislation,
applicable treaties, and customary international human rights law—are
respected.

•

Pre-Trial Chambers should monitor and uphold the rights of suspects during the
investigative phase. While there is a risk that this could be seen as stepping on
prosecutorial turf, the Chamber should request the Prosecution to notify the
judges if any investigative targets are being detained by national authorities,
with a view to monitoring whether the proceedings are being conducted with due
diligence.

•

Although the potential subjects of the Prosecution’s investigations will generally
be confidential, as demonstrated by the STL, internal defense offices can also play
a role in monitoring the rights of suspects prior to their transfer to the
court/tribunal in question, and petitioning the Chamber to take appropriate

•

measures.
In the absence of any applicable statutory provisions, the court, which has the
duty to ensure that the processes before it comply with international fair trial
standards, should clearly inform the defense in advance of the procedural
requirements and deadlines for filing an application seeking a remedy for
violations of their rights which have occurred prior to their arrest/detention.
Where such procedural time limitations impact negatively on the suspect’s rights,
under the relevant rules, the fundamental fair trial guarantees under the Statute
and under human rights law would mandate that discretion be exercised to favor
upholding the rights of the suspect or accused.

•

The court should also ensure that the defense has adequate time and resources to
prepare such an application. The court should monitor the Prosecution’s
disclosure obligations to ensure that any information concerning the relationship
between the Prosecution and national authorities which might be relevant to
such an application is disclosed, and is not unduly withheld due to security
reasons. In accordance with human rights jurisprudence,175 if any information
concerning the defendant’s claim is within the custody of the state and the state
refuses to disclose this information, or the state has provided the information to
the Prosecution on condition of confidentiality and refuses to lift the

175. Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 135 (July
29, 1988). See also Ipek v. Turkey, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. (extracts), ¶¶ 111–13 (2004); Orhan v.
Turkey, Application No. 25656/94, Judgment, ¶ 266 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 18, 2002) (“It is inherent in
proceedings relating to cases of this nature, where an individual applicant accuses State agents of
violating his rights under the Convention, that in certain instances solely the respondent
Government have access to information capable of corroborating or refuting these allegations. A
failure on a Government’s part to submit such information which is in their hands without a
satisfactory explanation may not only give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the wellfoundedness of the applicant’s allegations, but may also reflect negatively on the level of compliance
by a respondent State with its obligations . . . .”). See also id. ¶ 274.
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confidentiality vis-à-vis the defense—the court should draw the appropriate
inferences of fact in favor of the defendant.
•

When evaluating whether the defendant’s rights have been violated, the court
should adopt a defendant-centric inquiry: the primary emphasis should be on
whether the defendant’s rights have been violated, rather than requiring the
defendant to establish wrongdoing or responsibility on the part of an organ of the
tribunal as a preliminary step. Prosecutorial/tribunal wrongdoing should be an
aggravating factor rather than a prerequisite.

•

•

Even if the violation in question does not meet the requisite threshold to justify a
stay of the proceedings and the release of the defendant, the Chamber should also
consider whether it is appropriate to grant alternative remedies.
It is questionable whether the severity of the alleged crime that the defendant
has been charged with should be a deciding factor in determining the appropriate
remedy. As stated by the ICC Appeals Chamber—“a fair trial is the only means to
do justice”176—this maxim holds true irrespective of whether the defendant has
been charged with petty crimes or genocide—the “crime of crimes.”177 If the
violations have compromised the fairness of the judicial process, the proceedings
should be stayed. Moreover, whilst the objective of eliminating impunity is a
laudable raison d’être for these courts, it should also be borne in mind that
arbitrary arrest and detention can be so egregious in nature and impact on an
individual as to attract the moral and legal condemnation that we may properly
call crimes against human rights. The remedy provided by the court must
therefore be effective in deterring the Prosecutor/national authorities from
engaging in such practices in the future.

•

The courts/tribunals should also bear in mind that if the defendant is acquitted,
financial compensation cannot fully compensate a person for the loss of his or her
family life which he or she may have experienced during the period of arbitrary
detention. For this reason, the court should include a period of domestic detention
in its calculation concerning whether the defendant has been detained for an
unreasonable length of time and should therefore be provisionally released.
Similarly, if the defendant is convicted, this period of time should automatically
be included in the credit for time served which is deducted from the sentence.
Such credit is a right, however, and not a remedy for the violation itself. The
defendant should therefore be granted a separate remedy in addition to a
sentencing credit, for example, financial compensation or a further reduction of
sentence.

176. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeal of
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction
of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ¶ 37 (Dec. 14,
2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc243774.PDF.
177. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence (Oct. 2, 1998),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/ak81002e.pdf.
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